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Abstract 
This contribution contains an international comparison of preferences. Using two Discrete 
Choice Experiments (DCE), it measures willingness to pay for health insurance attributes in 
Germany and the Netherlands. Since the Dutch DCE was carried out right after the 2006 
health reform, which made citizens explicitly choose a health insurance contract, two research 
questions naturally arise. First, are the preferences with regard to contract attributes (such as 
Managed-Care-type restrictions of physician choice) similar between the two countries? 
Second, was the information campaign launched by the Dutch government in the context of 
the reform effective in the sense of reducing status quo bias? Based on random-effects Probit 
estimates, these two questions can be answered as follows. First, while much the same 
attributes have positive and negative willingness to pay values in the two countries, their 
magnitudes differ, pointing to differences in preference structure. Second, status quo bias in 
the Netherlands is one-half of the German value, suggesting that Dutch consumers were 
indeed made to bear the cost of decision making associated with choice of a health insurance 
contract. 
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1 Introduction and motivation 
Governments in industrial countries have been trying to respond to the raising cost of health 
care by modifying health insurance (copayments, bonus options for new claims) or changing 
the provision of health care (Managed Care). However, it is far from clear whether citizens 
are ready to accept these changes. If they conceive e.g. Managed Care as constraining their 
choice of physician, compensation must be offered to gain their acceptance. In insurance-
based systems, observed past choices provide little guidance because they are distorted by 
regulated contributions to health insurance, while in National Health Service-type systems, 
medical care has a tax price that is the same at a given income level. 
In this situation, experimental evidence concerning citizens’ preferences may be of value to 
avoid costly mistakes by health insurers and policy makers. The present contribution purports 
to report on so-called market experiments of the Discrete Choice (DCE) type in two 
insurance-based countries, Germany and the Netherlands. It should be of interest for at least 
three reasons. First, international comparisons of preferences are rare. Second, while the two 
populations are not too dissimilar culturally, German health policy has been characterized by 
new laws and regulations that have increased uncertainty on the part of patients (Böcken et 
al., 2005). By way of contrast, in the Netherlands a major pro-competitive reform was enacted 
in 2006, accompanied by a major information campaign designed to help citizens choose a 
health insurance contract. Third, the Dutch changes amount to an actual crossover between 
the two countries. The status quo in the Netherlands is gatekeeping by physicians (a variant of 
Managed Care), whereas consumers possibly prefer free choice of physician, which 
constitutes the status quo in Germany (where policy makers consider introducing Managed 
Care). Also, the Dutch population is familiar with a bonus for no claims reminiscent of auto 
liability insurance but might want to return to conventional health insurance with almost no 
copayment (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, 2006), whereas such bonus 
options have been debated in Germany as a reform variant. Against this backdrop, this paper 
seeks to answer two questions. 
Q1: Are preferences of German and Dutch consumers similar or dissimilar with regard to 
attributes of health insurance? 
Q2: Did the information campaign launched by the Dutch government in the context of the  
  2006 reform have an effect? 
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the theory underlying DCEs. 
Section 3 describes the DCE and its results for Germany, while Section 4 does the same for 
the Netherlands. Section 5 concludes with a comparison of the two countries. 
2 Theory underlying Discrete Choice Experiments 
Respondents participating in a DCE are supposed to maximize (expected) utility. However, 
experimenters will never know all the determinants of individual utility, which therefore give 
rise to a certain randomness in observed choices (Thurstone, 1927). Therefore, the relevant 
theoretical basis is the random utility model developed by McFadden (1974, 2001) and 
Manski (1977). Let Vij denote the level of utility optimally reached by individual i in situation 
j. In keeping with Lancaster (1966), alternative j is associated with price pj, a vector of 
attributes bj per unit of good associated with the alternative, income yi of the individual and 
his or her socioeconomic characteristics si. Finally, choices are also influenced by stochastic 
term ij that varies between individuals and alternatives. Indirect utility is thus given by 
 ij j j i i ijV v p ,b , y ,s , .          (1) 
The standard assumption is that this utility can be split into a deterministic and a stochastic 
part, with w(·) containing the deterministic component,  
   j j i i ij j j i i ijv p ,b , y ,c , w p ,b , y ,s   .       (2) 
Since for the experimenter decisions contain a stochastic element, all that can be stated is a 
probability Pij of individual i choosing alternative j rather than alternative l. Since alternative j 
must by assumption yield a utility at least as great as any other alternative l, one has 
   ij j j i i ij l l i i ilP Pr w p ,b , y ,s w p ,b , y ,s , l j         .    (3) 
Rearranging yields 
   ij il ij j j i i l l i iP Pr w p ,b , y ,s w p ,b , y ,s , l j         .    (4) 
The probability of choosing alternative j rather than l therefore amounts to the probability that 
the stochastic difference (il – ij) is dominated by the systematic difference in utilities  
(wij – wj). This condition however can only be related to observable choices if (il – ij) 
follows a distribution law. The major alternatives are the logistic and the normal. Since the 
normal distribution is subject to less restrictive assumptions (Train 2003, ch. 7; Greene 2000, 
ch. 19; Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985, ch. 3), this is the preferred variant (Probit model).  
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In the course of the experiment, every participant makes several choices. Therefore, 
observations are of the panel type, a fact that is reflected in the specification of the error term. 
Writing the difference between the two error terms as ij il ij    , the so-called random 
effects specification reads (Johnson and Desvousges, 1997), 
ij i ij    .           (5) 
In this equation, i denotes the individual-specific component, which remains the same for an 
individual in the course of the experiment. By way of contrast, ij  can vary between 
individuals i and choice scenarios j. 
The deterministic part w(·) of the utility function usually is assumed to be linear and hence 
additively separable (Johnson and Desvousges, 1997; Ryan and Gerard, 2003),  
  0
1
K
j j i i k jk p j y i s i
k
w p ,b y ,s b p y s    

     ,      (6) 
with ( k p y s, , ,    ) denoting the parameters belonging to the arguments of the utility function. 
In particular, k denotes the marginal utility of product attribute k. 
Note the restrictiveness of this formulation, stating that all respondents have the same 
additively separable function w(·). Since the contribution paid for health insurance constitutes 
an attribute as well, is also true that the marginal loss of utility due to an increased 
contribution must be the same for all individuals, independently of their income. Such an 
assumption is deemed unrealistic because usually marginal utility of income is assumed to 
decrease in income. However, socioeconomic differences in marginal utility of attributes can 
be made part of the specification by complementing the function above with interaction terms 
of the type  kk j ib y  . Partial differentiation of w(·) w.r.t. bjk then results in k k iy  . For 
example, if 0k   and 0k k   , marginal utility of attribute k is positive but decreases as 
a function of income. 
In the course of the experiment, participants need to trade off between the different attributes 
of a scenario. As always, their preference structure is reflected by the marginal rate of 
substitution (MRS) between two attributes k and m, given by the ratio of the two respective 
marginal utilities (dropping subscript i for simplicity),  
k
k ,m
m
v / bMRS
v / b
     .         (7) 
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Figure 1: Marginal rate of substitution between two attributes 
k
m
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This trade-off and its experimental measurement are illustrated by Figure 1. The point of 
departure is the status quo, symbolized by point A, with much (k’) of attribute k and little (m’) 
of attribute m. Now the respondent is faced with alternative B, with only k’’ < k’ of attribute k, 
but m’’ > m’ of attribute m in return. If the respondent prefers the status quo, it must have 
higher utility than the alternative. This means that B lies below the indifference curve through 
A, causing the respondent to stay with the status quo. However, another alternative given by 
point C would be preferred to the status quo. Clearly, through repeated choices, the 
indifference curve can be interpolated, with m/k denoting the marginal rate of substitution 
MRS between the two attributes. 
Now redefine attribute m as the net income after having paid the price for the good (here, the 
premium for the health insurance contract). By partially differentiating the indirect utility 
function with regard to the price attribute, one therefore obtains the (negative of) the marginal 
utility of income. The MRS then indicates how much income an individual is prepared to 
sacrifice in order to obtain more of attribute k. This amounts to the marginal willingness to 
pay for attribute k, measured in money (Louviere et al. 2000, ch. 3). 
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2 The Discrete Choice Experiment in Germany 
The choice of relevant attributes describing a health insurance contract is far from clear. 
However, in Germany the policy debate had been revolving about the following attributes, 
which also turned out to be ‘important’ in a qualitative pretest (see Table 1).  
(1) Amount of physician choice. Here, the status quo is free physician choice. One 
alternative is a physician list established by the health insurer, based on cost and 
quality criteria. A second alternative is gatekeeping, meaning that a primary care 
physician must be contacted first in the event of illness. It is only then that the patient 
can choose a specialist. The third, most restrictive alternative is gatekeeping combined 
with a list of specialists participating in a network. Again, the gatekeeping physician 
must be contacted first; in addition however, referrals can only be made to other 
network physicians (who must take part in quality assurance meetings and continued 
education). In total, this attribute thus has four levels. 
(2) Second opinion. Here, the status quo requires patients to come up with 10 Euro per 
quarter for every additional physician they contact unless referred by the treating 
physician. In the alternative, one second opinion per quarter is free of charge. This 
attribute has two levels. 
(3) Additional services or information provided by health insurers. The status quo is 
no particular services or information provided. However, when insurers are to offer 
contracts with new ways of providing care, consumers’ demand for information quite 
likely increases. Therefore, the alternative scenario provides for a qualified person 
available on the telephone 24 hours per day for helping to organize medial care and to 
inform about the seriousness of symptoms. Again, this attribute has two levels. 
(4) Incentives. Since the insured do not have to fully bear the financial consequences of 
an illness, they might be tempted to skim on preventive effort or opt for the more 
costly therapy [Zweifel et al. (2009) ch. 6]. The status quo is characterized by the 
absence of any measures designed to counteract these moral hazard effects. A first 
alternative is a bonus option for no claims. If no health care services (except 
recommended preventive and screening services) are utilized during a year, there is a 
premium rebate of 500 Euro. The second alternative is a yearly deductible of 500 
Euro, again with the exceptions just mentioned. Third, an insured who proves to have 
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performed preventive activities recommended by the insurer would obtain a bonus 
such as reimbursement of fees or a free week-end at a spa. 
(5) Increase or decrease of the annual health insurance contribution. Participants 
were asked to check their pay schedule in order to calculate their personal share of the 
total contribution in Euro. The alternatives were increases and decreases of 200, 300, 
400, and 500 Euro annually. The higher amounts seem unrealistic; however, they need 
to be set in a way that respondents sometimes move away from the status quo, 
generating information about their preferences. In total, this attribute has eight levels.  
 
Table 1: Status quo quo card 
Your current policy 
1. Amount of physician choice Unrestricted 
2. Second opinion 10 Euro fee without a referral 
3. Additional services provided by insurer No special services or information provided 
4. Incentives No special incentives 
5. Health insurance contribution Your current annual contribution in Euro ___ 
 
These five attributes and their levels combine to form scenarios that can be compared to the 
status quo. There is a total of 512 (= 42 * 22 * 8) scenarios, too many for an experiment. Their 
number was reduced using a so-called optimal design (Carlsson and Martinsson, 2003). The 
resulting 24 scenarios were split up in random order into three sets with eight decisions each. 
Table 2 contains an example of a decision card. The DCE was fielded in September 2005, 
involving around 1,000 individuals of age 25 and older, all members of statutory health 
insurance. Subscribers to private health insurance were excluded because different product 
attributes would have been relevant to them. 
The typical MC attributes (physician list, gatekeeping, network) are hypothesized to be 
associated with losses of utility on the part of consumers (see the negative entries in the 
column, ‘Expected sign’). And indeed, the three coefficients are all negative. Conversely, a 
second opinion provided free of charge and additional services provided by the health insurer 
are valued positively, as predicted 
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Table 2: Example of a decision card 
Alternative 1 
Amount of physician choice Physician list 
Second opinion 10 Euro fee without referral 
Additional services provided by insurer Patient counseling provided by insurer 
Incentives Bonus for preventive behavior 
Increase/decrease of health insurance  
contribution Reduction by 500 Euro annually 
I opt for this alternative 
I opt for my current policy 
  
  
 
The following two attributes, bonus for no claim and deductible, are of particular interest. 
One could argue that a bonus for no claims amounting to 500 Euro exposes the insured to the 
same risk as a fixed deductible of 500 Euro because they will end up paying the first 500 Euro 
out of pocket in both cases. However, this argument overlooks the fact that a bonus option 
permits consumers to separate two losses in time that occur simultaneously under the 
deductible, viz. the health loss and the financial loss caused by the cost of medical care. With 
a deductible, these two losses are perfectly correlated during a quarter (say). With a bonus 
option, they are separated in time because consumers can sacrifice their bonus to obtain full 
coverage, shifting the financial loss to later in the guise of a higher premium [Zweifel (1992), 
ch. 3]. Indeed, Table 3 shows that respondents valued the bonus option favorably, while 
resisting a deductible of the same amount. However, they are also interested in a bonus for 
preventive behavior. The price attribute has a negative coefficient as predicted and is of very 
high statistical significance.  
The constant is worth commenting. If the core model were completely specified, it should be 
zero because the attributes included account fully for the difference in utility between the 
status quo and the respective alternative – a rather unlikely event. The negative value of the 
constant points to status quo bias, i.e. left-out determinants of utility (in the present context, 
notably the cost of decision making) that cause the alternative to be valued less highly ceteris 
paribus. Note that Table 3 contains two estimates. As shown by Bech and Gyrd-Hansen 
(2005), the constant cannot directly be interpreted as status quo bias when dummy-coded 
attributes are present. Preferences with regard to the status quo values of these attributes are 
absorbed in the constant in this case. To solve this problem, Louviere et al. (2000) suggest 
assigning values {-1, 1} rather than {0,1} to these attributes. While this purges the estimated 
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constant from influences due to preferences for the status-quo level of binary-coded attributes, 
estimated Probit coefficients are halved. To reflect the impact of choice, they thus need to be 
doubled. More generally, effects-coded slope coefficients can be transformed into binary-
coded ones [Bech and Gyrd-Hansen (2005); Zweifel et al. (2009)].  
As a final comment on Table 3, note that the estimated marginal effects are reasonable. For 
example, a physician list lowers the probability of changing in favor of the alternative by an 
estimated 14 percentage points. Having to first visit a gatekeeping physician of one’s choice 
is a far less stringent restriction. It is associated with a probability reduction of 5.3 percentage 
points only. Having to sign up with a physician network comprising also specialists has a 
lock-in effect, causing the probability to choose the alternative to drop by an estimated 8.9 
percentage points. Compared to these attributes, a second opinion free of charge and extra 
services provided by the insurer have less impact (3.9 and 6.0 percentage points, 
respectively), as one would expect. The one astonishing result is that the bonus for preventive 
behavior apparently is as important (in absolute value) as a deductible of 500 Euro. 
Using eq. (7), marginal willingness-to-pay (WTP) values can be calculated from the 
coefficients displayed in Table 3. The three attributes typical of MC options have all to be 
compensated (see Table 4). The maximum is attained for the physician list, amounting to 
346 Euro per year, followed by participation in a physician network (203 Euro) and 
acceptance of gatekeeping (115 Euro). Obtaining a second opinion free of charge is valued at 
80 Euro and extra services provided by the health insurer, at 123 Euro per year. A bonus for 
no claims triggers a positive WTP value, whereas a deductible amounting to the same value of 
500 Euro would have to be compensated. The difference between the two is striking, 
amounting to no less than 605 Euro (= 359 – (–246)). Finally, the bonus for preventive effort 
is valued at 203 Euro annually.  
Conclusion 1: In the German DCE, there is clear evidence that respondents value health  
   insurance attributes in a way one would expect from economic considerations. 
Choices were analyzed using the Probit model, with the random effects specification 
described in eq. (5). The only explanatory variables are the (changes in) attributes, making up 
the so-called core model (see Table 3). 
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Table 3: Estimation results for the core model (attributes only), Germany 
Attribute Exp. sign Coefficient Std. err. z value Marg. eff. 
Physician list - -0.6957 *** 0.0623 -11.17 -0.1402 
Gatekeeping - -0.2320 *** 0.0585 -3.97 -0.0528 
Network -  0.4092 *** 0.0594 -6.88 -0.0890 
Second opinion +  0.1607 *** 0.0455   3.53   0.0387 
Services insurer +  0.2468 *** 0.0438  5.64   0.0597 
Bonus no claims +  0.7230 *** 0.0603 12.00   0.1991 
Deductible - -0.4947 *** 0.0661 -7.50 -0.1075 
Bonus prev. beh. +  0.4106 *** 0.0796   5.15   0.1120 
Contribution - -0.0020 *** 0.0001 -30.59 -0.0005 
Constanta) 
Constantb) 
0 
0 
-1.0073 
-0.9785 
*** 
*** 
0.0745 
0.0438 
-13.53 
-24.24 
 
σ = 0.9462      ρ = 0.4724 
Log likelihood: -3,074 
χ2 (0) = 742.57, Prob > χ2 = 0.0000  
n = 7,155 
*** Coefficient different from zero with error probability < 1 percent 
a) Binary coding 
b) Effects coding (see text) 
 
Table 4: Marginal willingness-to-pay values for attributes (Germany), Euro/year 
Attribute WTP Significance Std. Error 
Physician list -346 *** 31.04 
Gatekeeping -115 *** 29.28 
Network -203 *** 29.80 
Second opinion 80 *** 22.33 
Service insurer 123 *** 22.32 
Bonus no claims 359 *** 30.04 
Deductible -246 *** 33.51 
Bonus preventive behavior 203 *** 37.87 
Constanta) 
Constantb) 
-500 
-486 
*** 
*** 
36.49 
21.49 
*** WTP different from zero with an error probability of < 1 percent. Standard errors calculated using the delta method  
a) Binary coding 
b) Effects coding 
 10
In the following, status quo bias will be analyzed in greater detail because of its importance 
for policy. From Table 4, one can conclude that Germans are unwilling to move away from 
the status quo unless compensated by at least 486 Euro on average (effects coding). However, 
this amount varies with socioeconomic characteristics. The figures of Table 5 are derived 
from a comprehensive model that includes interaction terms in the Probit equation as 
described below equation (6). Using equation (7) again, one can calculate WTP estimates, 
with all other characteristics set at their median sample values. The values shown are effects-
coded; the binary-coded ones are documented in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
While there is no recognizable gender difference, status quo bias does significantly increase 
with age, reaching an overall maximum of 776 Euro among those above 59 years. Somewhat 
surprisingly, education does not seem to have a significant influence. As could be expected 
however, respondents who subjectively feel in bad health require particularly high 
compensation for moving away from the status quo, as is true of chronic patients. This is 
remarkable because so-called demand management programs focus on chronically ill persons, 
who are alleged to value them because of better coordination of therapy. This expectation is 
not borne out; to the contrary, chronically ill respondents exhibit an especially marked 
preference for the status quo. These findings also hold for binary-coded estimates (see Table 
A1). 
Conclusion 2: The German DCE points to a marked status quo bias, which is especially 
     marked among the chronically ill and respondents with a bad health status. 
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Table 5: Group-specific status quo bias (effects coding), Germany 
 WTP values for changing contract (effects coding) 
Value (in Euro)  Std. error 
Women 
Men 
-492*** 
-477*** 
 30.05 
31.79 
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.7227/(0.13) 
Age < 43 b) 
Age 43 – 59 b) 
Age > 59 b) 
-360*** 
-463*** 
-776*** 
 27.38 
35.23 
71.73 
Prob > chi2/(chi2) a) 0.0000/(30.64) 
Education low c) 
Education medium c) 
Education high c) 
-514*** 
-489*** 
-514*** 
 32.02 
44.62 
41.38 
Prob > chi2/(chi2) a) 0.2256/(2.98) 
Healthy (subjective) 
Ill (subjective) 
-366*** 
-556*** 
 30.28 
30.32 
Prob > chi2/(chi2) a) 0.0000/(19.53) 
Non-chronic 
Chronic 
-428*** 
-618*** 
 22.88 
52.08 
Prob > chi2/(chi2) a) 0.0001/(14.54) 
a) Group-specific values differ with an error probability = Prob > chi2 (chi2 value after the slash) 
b) Each of the three age groups contains about 33 percent of observations 
c) Individuals with 9, 12, and 18 years of education, respectively 
*** (**, *) WTP values (compensations asked, respectively) different from zero with error probability of > 1 (> 5, > 10) 
percent  
3 The Discrete Choice Experiment in the Netherlands 
A second DCE was performed in the Netherlands in May 2006, after a major reform. By 
March 2006, every citizen had to have explicitly chosen a health insurance contract, with a 
great deal of information provided by the government through flyers and the media. 
Therefore, respondents had borne the (lowered) cost of decision making associated with the 
choice of a health insurance policy. While most of the attributes were the same as in 
Germany, two adjustments had to be made. First, in the pretest a second opinion free of 
charge turned out to be far less important than expeditious (defined to be within four weeks in 
the DCE) access to hospital care, waiting for hospital treatment being a hotly debated topic in 
the Netherlands. Second, the status quo for physician choice and incentives had to be defined 
differently. Already before the reform of 2006, physician choice had been constrained in that 
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patients were obliged to contact a gatekeeping physician first. Therefore, one of the 
alternatives in the experiment became free physician choice. Moreover, there was already a 
bonus for no claims under the status quo, attaining a maximum of 255 Euro annually. Some 
760 respondents took part in the main survey, of which only five never made a decision (in 
comparison, in Germany 40 out of 1,000). The Probit estimates are displayed in Table 6. 
The three variables relating to physician choice are highly significant and have the predicted 
sign. Guaranteed access to hospital care within four weeks is positively valued as predicted, 
as are additional services provided by the health insurer. However, the transition from the 
existing bonus option for no claims worth 255 Euro to one worth 500 Euro does not trigger a 
positive WTP. What is strongly resisted is a deductible amounting to 500 Euro annually. A 
bonus for preventive behavior is valued positively and an increase in the annual contribution, 
negatively (as expected).  
 
Table 6: Estimation results for the core model (contract attributes only), Netherlands 
 Exp. sign Coefficient Std. err. z value Marg. eff. 
Free choice of 
physician a) 
+ 0.2278 *** 0.0616 3.70  0.0586 
Physician list a) - -0.3970 *** 0.0670 -5.92 -0.0875 
Network a) - -0.2207 *** 0.0645 -3.42 -0.0509 
Hospital access + 0.2030 *** 0.0501 4.04  0.0494 
Service insurer + 0.1626 *** 0.04780 3.39  0.0397 
No bonus option - 0.0212  0.0586 0.36  0.0052 
Deductible - -1.1824 *** 0.0718 -16.47 -0.2256 
Bonus preventive beh. + 0.0006  0.0808 0.01  0.0001 
Contribution - -0.0029 *** 0.0001 -27.53 -0.0007 
Constantb) 
Constantc) 
0 
0 
-0.7435 
-0.9483 
***
*** 
0.0753 
0.0414 
-9.87 
-22.92 
 
σ = 0,8258      ρ = 0.4055 
Log likelihood: -2.541,09 
χ2 (0) = 11,179,10. Prob > χ2 = 0.0000  
n = 5,976 
a) Status quo is gatekeeping, b) Binary coding c) Effects coding 
*** Coefficient different from zero with error probability < 1 percent 
 
The estimated marginal effects are reasonable. Free choice of physician (recall that the status 
quo in the Netherlands is gatekeeping) is associated with a 5.9 percentage point increase in 
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the probability of choosing the alternative. The transition from gatekeeping to a physician list 
established by the health insurer serves to decrease this probability by 8.8 percentage points. 
Assuming local constancy of MRS, a change from free physician choice to such a physician 
list can be estimated to lower choice probability by 14.7 (= 5.9 + 8.8) percentage points. A 
change to a physician network would have a somewhat smaller lowering effect, of 11.0  
(= 5.9 + 5.1) percentage points. Access to the hospital within four weeks is associated with an 
increase of 4.9 percentage points in choice probability, followed by additional services 
provided by insurers (4.0 percentage points). While increasing the bonus for no claims from 
255 to 500 Euro does not affect choice probability, the most striking result is that an annual 
deductible amounting to 500 Euro would cause the likelihood of accepting the alternative to 
drop by no less than 23 percentage points. 
Again, WTP values can be derived from the estimated coefficients. Concentrating on the 
Dutch values (see Table 7; a comparison with the German counterparts will follow in Section 
4), one notes first that changing from gatekeeping to free choice of physician would trigger a 
WTP value of 79 Euro, while the change to a physician list would require compensation to the 
tune of 137 Euro per year. Again assuming local constancy of MRS, one would therefore 
estimate the transition from free physician choice to a physician list to require a compensation 
of 216 Euro (= 79 + 137) annually, compared to 155 Euro (= 79 + 76) for a transition to a 
physician network. These estimates make intuitive sense since a physician list constitutes the 
harshest restriction, followed by a physician network (with its potential lock-in effect) and 
followed by gatekeeping (the status quo in the Netherlands). Guaranteed hospital access is 
valued somewhat less, presumably because respondents take the comparatively low likelihood 
of hospitalization into account. Additional services provided by the health insurer is at the low 
end with 56 Euro per year, while increasing the bonus option to 500 Euro and the bonus for 
preventive behavior have no significant WTP values. By way of contrast, a 500 Euro 
deductible would have to be compensated by no less than 409 Euro to be accepted. Status quo 
bias amounts to an estimated 328 Euro (effects-coded). 
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Table 7: Marginal willingness-to-pay for attributes (derived from the core model), 
Netherlands 
 a) WTP Netherlands Std. error 
WTP 
Germanyb) Std. error
 b) 
Free Choice of physician  79*** 21.52 -115***
c) 29.28 
Physician list  -137*** 25.02 -346*** 33.04 
Network  -76*** 22.09 -203*** 29.80 
Hospital access   70*** 17.12 n.a. n.a. 
Second opinion  n.a. n.a.    80*** 22.33 
Service insurer     56*** 16.76  123*** 22.32 
Bonus option  7 20.25     359***c) 30.04 
Deductible  -409*** 27.37 -246*** 33.51 
Bonus for preventive  behavior  0 27.95  203*** 37.87 
Constantd) 
Constante) 
 
 
-256*** 
-328*** 
25.87 
37.00 
-500*** 
-486*** 
36.49 
21.49 
Figures in Euro per year 
a) Difference between Germany and the Netherlands significant at the 5 percent level or better (see text for  
   details) 
b) Transferred from Table 4.  
c) Attributes with different status quo in Germany. Instead of free choice of physician the WTP value for gatekeeping and is 
indicated in the table and instead of an increase the bonus for no claims from 255 to 500 Euro in the Netherlands the bonus in 
Germany amounts to 500 Euro. 
d) Binary coding 
e) Effects coding 
*** WTP different from zero with an error probability of < 1 percent 
 
In Table 8 group-specific estimates of status quo bias (effects-coded) are shown (see Table 
A2 for binary-coded ones). For the Netherlands, there is no evidence of a gender-specific 
difference but of an increase with age. Higher education does not go along with a change in 
status quo bias. However, those who feel subjectively ill require higher compensation for 
departing from the status quo. 
Conclusion 3: The Dutch DCE involved attributes that are relevant to consumers, with the  
     exception of an increased bonus option for no claims and a bonus for  
     preventive behavior. The other estimated WTP values are in accordance with 
     economic considerations. 
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Table 8: Group-specific status quo estimates, Netherlands compared to Germany  
(effects coding) 
 WTP values for changing contract (effects coding) 
Netherlands Std. error Germanye) Std. error 
Women 
Men 
-306*** 
-353*** 
21.35 
43.66 
492*** 
477*** 
30.05 
31.79 
Prob > chi2/(chi2 )a) 0.1507/(2.06) 0.7227/(0.13) 
Age < 41 b) e) 
Age 41 – 55 
Age > 55 
-214*** 
-324*** 
-536*** 
19.80 
26.57 
51.11 
-360*** 
-463*** 
-776*** 
27.38 
35.23 
71.73 
Prob > chi2/(chi2) a) 0.0000/(38.83) 0.0000/(30.64) 
Education low c) 
Education medium c) 
Education high c) 
-345*** 
-365*** 
-290*** 
32.14 
33.17 
22.81 
-514*** 
-489*** 
-514*** 
32.02 
44.62 
41.38 
Prob > chi2/(chi2) a) 0.1266/(4.13) 0.2256/(2.98) 
Healthy (subjective) 
Ill (subjective) 
-585*** 
-378*** 
129.43 
25.73 
-366*** 
-556*** 
30.28 
30.32 
Prob > chi2/(chi2) a) 0.0000/(23.00) 0.0000/(19.53) 
Non-chronic 
Chronic 
-290*** 
-315*** 
17.26 
36.79 
-428*** 
-618*** 
22.88 
52.08 
Prob > chi2/(chi2) a) 0.0009/(11.03) 0.0001/(14.51) 
a) Group-specific values differ with an error probability = Prob > chi2 (chi2 value after slash) 
b) Age groups are < 43, 43-59, and > 59 in the German sample to contain about 55 percent of observations 
c) Individuals with 9, 12, and 18 years of education, respectively  
*** (**, *) WTP values (compensations asked) with error probability of > 1 (>5, > 10) percent different from zero 
4 Germany and the Netherlands compared  
The comparison between the two countries is based on a joint dataset containing only 
overlapping attributes. Merging the two datasets can be justified in view of the very similar 
estimates obtained for the standard error of the estimate  and the coefficient of 
autocorrelation , respectively (see Tables 3 and 6). A dummy variable taking on the value 1 
if the observation relates to the Netherlands is interacted with the explanatory variables of the 
core model. The resulting estimates differ so slightly from those displayed in Tables 7 and 8 
that they are not worth reporting separately. Table 7 shows the relative importance of product 
attributes in the Netherlands compared to Germany. A ‘’ indicates that a difference is 
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statistically significant. Recall that WTP values for the Netherlands are measured as 
deviations from a counterfactual status quo ‘free choice of physician’.  
Thus, Dutch respondents would have to be compensated less for accepting a physician list 
created by health insurers than their German counterparts. It seems that they are already used 
to insurers having influence on physician choice. However, the transition to a physician 
network would have to be compensated to the same degree in the two countries. On the other 
hand, in the Dutch sample extra services provided by the health insurer are valued less than in 
the German counterpart. One of the most interesting differences is the assessment of a bonus 
for no claims. The Dutch sample exhibits no willingness to pay to increase this bonus from 
255 to 500 Euro annually, whereas in the German sample there is a substantial WTP for 
adopting it. It may be that Dutch respondents made the experience in the past that saving the 
bonus is not so easy. With regard to the 500 Euro deductible, the Dutch appear to be more risk 
averse than the Germans in that they would have to be compensated by no less than 409 Euro, 
compared to 246 Euro in the German sample. And finally, a bonus for preventive behavior 
does not trigger any willingness to pay at all in the Dutch sample but is valued with a 
remarkable 203 Euro per year in Germany. Since the WTP values differ between the two 
samples, with those for the physician network as the only exception, one may draw 
Conclusion 4: Question Q1 can be answered as follows. Whereas most of comparable 
      attributes of a health insurance contract are valued the same qualitatively, 
      almost all WTP values differ quantitatively, pointing to preference 
      differences between the two countries. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that the differences found can also be caused by 
differences in the status quo or in excluded non-overlapping attributes [the utility function 
may not be additively separable as assumed in equation (6)].  
The last row of Table 7 provides a preliminary answer to the second question. In the Dutch 
sample, status quo bias amounts to between one-half (binary coding) and two-thirds (effects 
coding) of the German value. However, Table 8 indicates that the determinants of status quo 
have very much the same effects in the two countries. It increases with higher age and is 
higher among the subjectively ill and the chronically ill than among the others (no 
significance tests available for checking differences in gradients). On the other hand, neither 
gender nor education seem to matter in the two countries. In all, the evidence supports 
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Conclusion 5: The answer to question Q2 is that the information campaign launched by the 
    Dutch government in 2006 may well have served to reduce status quo bias 
   compared to Germany across all socioeconomic groups distinguished.  
As a final piece of evidence, the standard errors shown in Table 8 can be compared. The 
majority of them are lower in the Dutch than in the German sample, although the Dutch DCE 
involved only 760 rather than 1,000 respondents. Given the same sample size, they should 
even be 13 percent higher, ceteris paribus [(760/1,000)½ = 0.87]. Apparently, the 2006 reform 
caused citizens to have borne the decision-making cost associated with opting for a particular 
health insurance contract by March 2006, just before the DCE was fielded. Of course, there is 
still the alternate explanation that the Dutch have more homogenous preferences with regard 
to health insurance than the Germans. 
5 Conclusions 
This contribution is one of the few that seek to compare preferences across national borders. 
The objective was to find out whether in spite of cultural similarities, the Dutch might value 
attributes of health insurance and provision of health care differently than the Germans. The 
instrument used for this comparison was two Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) performed 
in Germany (with no effective reform) and in the Netherlands right after the 2006 reform 
which made citizens explicitly choose their health insurance. Important contract attributes are 
valued in the same qualitative way by the two populations. Managed-Care-type features such 
as a physician list established by the health insurer, gatekeeping, and adherence to a physician 
network must be compensated in both populations. They would also have to be highly 
compensated to accept a yearly deductible of 500 Euro. However, bonuses for proved 
preventive effort and no claims are received favorably only in Germany, not in the 
Netherlands. Differences also arise with regard to the quantitative values. Notably, a 500 Euro 
deductible has to be compensated almost twice as much in the Netherlands than in Germany. 
Therefore, one first has to conclude that there is evidence of differences in the preference 
structure of the two populations. Second, however, there is a striking difference in terms of 
status quo bias, which clearly requires less compensation to be overcome in the Netherlands 
than in Germany. Therefore, the information campaign launched by the Dutch government in 
the context of the 2006 reform may well have been effective.   
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Appendix 
Table A1: Group-specific status quo bias (binary coding), Germany 
 WTP values for changing contract (binary coding) 
Value (in Euro)  Std. error 
Women 
Men 
-508*** 
-483*** 
 50.05 
53.33 
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.7392/(0.11) 
Age < 43 b) 
Age 43 – 59 b) 
Age > 59 b) 
-329*** 
-407*** 
-940*** 
 50.13 
58.98 
106.87 
Prob > chi2/(chi2) a) 0.0000/(27.70) 
Education low c) 
Education medium c) 
Education high c) 
-590*** 
-520*** 
-411*** 
 92.07 
43.86 
74.72 
Prob > chi2/(chi2) a) 0.4642/(1.54) 
Healthy (subjective) 
Ill (subjective) 
-297*** 
-609*** 
 54.05 
48.98 
Prob > chi2/(chi2) a) 0.0000/(18.95) 
Non-chronic 
Chronic 
-446*** 
-641*** 
 39.72 
87.07 
Prob > chi2/(chi2) a) 0.0416/(4.15) 
a) Group-specific values differ with an error probability = Prob > chi2 (chi2 value after the 
   slash) 
b) Each of the three age groups contains about 33 percent of observations 
c) Individuals with 9, 12, and 18 years of education, respectively 
*** (**, *) WTP values (compensations asked, respectively) different from zero with error probability of > 1 (> 5, > 10) 
percent  
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Table A2: Group-specific status quo estimates, Netherlands compared to Germany 
(binary coding) 
 WTP values for changing contract (binary coding) 
Netherlands Std. error Germany e) Std. error e) 
Women 
Men 
-226*** 
-292*** 
34.65 
38.90 
-508*** 
-483*** 
50.05 
53.33 
Prob > chi2/(chi2)a) 0.2020/(1.63) 0.7392/(0.11) 
Age < 41 b) e) 
Age 41 – 55 
Age > 55 
-162*** 
-234*** 
-479*** 
35.56 
42.63 
70.97 
-329*** 
-407*** 
-940*** 
50.13 
58.98 
106.87 
Prob > chi2/(chi2) a) 0.0559/(5.81) 0.0090/(27.70) 
Education low c) 
Education medium c) 
Education high c) 
-212*** 
-261*** 
-336*** 
37.60 
50.87 
    51.46 
-590*** 
-520*** 
-411*** 
92.07 
43.86 
74.72 
Prob > chi2/(chi2) a) 0.1521/(3.77) 0.4642/(1.54) 
Healthy (subjective) 
Ill (subjective) 
-164*** 
-325*** 
33.99 
38.33 
-297*** 
-609*** 
54.05 
48.98 
Prob > chi2/(chi2) a) 0.0017/(9.88) 0.0000/(18.95) 
Non-chronic 
Chronic 
-225*** 
-351*** 
28.67 
58.44 
-446*** 
-641*** 
39.72 
87.07 
Prob > chi2/(chi2) a) 0.0542/(3.71) 0.0416/(4.15) 
a) Group-specific values differ with an error probability = Prob > chi2 (chi2 value after slash) 
b) Age groups are < 43, 43-59, and > 59 in the German sample to contain about 33 percent of  
   observations 
c) Individuals with 9, 12, and 18 years of education, respectively  
*** (**, *) WTP values (compensations asked) with error probability of > 1 (> 5, > 10) percent different from zero 
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